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A Research and Educational Affiliate of TransAfrica OCTOBER 1982 
THE U.S. AND SOUTH AFRICA: THE NEW RIGHT CONNECTION 
The election of Ronald Reagan must have done more to buoy the hopes of white South Africans than any event in the last twenty 
years. South Africa now feels that it has a "friend" in the White House. The bond cementing this relationship is the host of con-
nections between South Africa, New Right activists, conservative think tanks, registered foreign agents, and the administration. 
With the revelation of the Muldergate scandal in 1979, it became clear that the South African regime viewed the influencing of 
what Esche/ Rhoodie described as U.S. "opinion formers and decision takers" as an important part of its struggle to remain in 
power. Rhoodie, mastermind of the major propaganda war begun in 1974, spearheaded the elaborate effort aimed at buying in-
fluence, supporting friends, and punishing enemies in the U.S. 
One such "enemy" was Iowa Senator Dick Clark, Chairman of the Senate's Africa Subcommittee, outspoken critic of South 
Africa's apartheid policy, and supporter of economic sanctions against the country. Clark was narrowly defeated in 1978 in a close 
election which he had been expected to win. Rhoodie claimed credit for Clark's defeat-as well as John Tunney's defeat-later 
when the Muldergate scandal broke. Rhoodie admitted to funneling South African money into Robert Jepsen 's successful electoral 
campaign against Clark-a clear violation of U.S. law. Senator Jepsen, however, has denied these allegations. 
Since Reagan's electoral victory, South Africa's crimes at home have been explained away; and its crimes against the American 
democratic process have been ignored. Investigations into South African contributions to and interference in U.S. electoral cam-
paigns appear to be going nowhere. The Justice Department probe into these allegations was conducted by Joel Lisker, who now 
serves as Staff Director of Senator Denton 's avowedly right wing Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism . The U.S. Attorney in-
vestigating Senator Jepsen 's campaign has been replaced. All of the numerous allegations made by Esche/ Rhoodie, now quieted, 
have yet to result in action againsi South Africa or its agents. Instead, President Reagan has surrounded himself with foreign 
policymakers who are clearly friends of South Africa's white minority government. What this may mean, both here and in South 
Africa, is unclear. In the interview below, Randall Robinson, TransAfrica Forum's Executive Director, discusses the issues raised 
by this growing New Right-South Africa connection with former Senator Dick Clark. □ 
What role specifically did South Africa or South Afri-
can funded groups play in your electoral defeat? Are 
there other examples of such involvement? 
CLARK: Technically and legally, it's impossible to 
know. It is a violation of federal law for a foreign coun-
try to put money into a campaign. Therefore, the only 
way South Africa can put money into a campaign is to 
do it illegally. I cannot say that they gave money to any 
particular organization or that they gave money to my 
opponent because I don't have that kind of evidence. 
The circumstantial evidence, however, is rather over-
whelming. Esche! M. Rhoodie, the Secretary of Infor-
Dick Clark, Former Chairman, Senate Africa Subcommittee 
mation, the department that distributed funds in the 
United States and in other countries, has specifically 
said that they put money into the campaign and took 
credit for my defeat. I don't know that I'd give them 
that much credit. A South Africa newspaper editor, 
who has looked into the situation carefully, checked 
many of Rhoodie 's confessions as to where he put 
money and when and has found all of them to be ac-
curate. The long and the short of it is that South Africa 
(SOUTH AFRICA] OBVIOUSLY HAS THIS COUN-
TRY WELL COVERED IN TERMS ON WHAT'S 
HAPPENING WHERE AND WHO IS DOING 
WHAT AND WHY ... THERE WAS NEVER 
ANYTHING I DID OR SAID ABOUT WHICH THEY 
DIDN'T KNOW. THE PRIME MINISTER OB-
VIOUSLY HAD MORE INFORMATION AND 
KNEW MORE ABOUT WHAT I HAD SAID THAN I 
REMEMBERED. 
undoubtedly did put money into the campaign. The 
question is where and how much? 
The last poll that I had taken showed me running 
ahead 57 to 27 points four weeks before the election. 
There were other polls being taken that showed no slip-
page right until the end. The Right to Life Movement 
undoubtedly was the most significant factor in the turn 
around on the last Sunday. It's hard to know exactly 
how much it accounted for . I lost the election by a little 
over one point, and Right to Life was more responsible 
than anything else. It's impossible to know whether 
South Africa put any money into that organization or 
not although I'm confident that they put a good deal of 
money into the campaign. 
If South African money was put into the campaign, 
what are the implications for the American political 
process? 
CLARK: It shouldn't be underestimated or overesti-
mated. Obviously, you have a case of a foreign power 
becoming involved in making the determination for a 
local constituency or state in another country as to who 
is going to represent them. If that is successful, it means 
that people who take positions that are contrary to 
another government's position are subject to being 
defeated based on what position they take on a foreign 
power. This clearly is inappropriate and illegal. 
On the other hand, one should not look at it as being 
all that unique. The U.S. does the same thing in a 
number of other countries: the CIA gets involved in 
foreign elections and puts money into campaigns. They 
take credit for having saved Western Europe after the 
war in this manner . It is dangerous, nonetheless, 
because a country can afford to put up a great deal of 
money. What's a million dollars if you can change an 
election or change an attitude? It's the cheapest and the 
best kind of investment for a country. Therefore, we 
need to guard against it very carefully. 
Can you describe the funneling of money from South 
Africa to American right wing organizations? 
CLARK: I really can't. It's very unfortunate that 
Esche! Rhoodie was not asked to go into that when he 
made the revelations in France. It's not hard to do 
because a lot of the right wing organizations are very 
friendly with South Africa. There's a working relation-
ship between them. 
It's never hard to move money in politics. It's harder 
today than it was before we had the Federal Elections 
Commission (FEC). Before we had these laws you could 
move money in and out of politics without having to 
record it. In the last several years so many of these right 
wing organizations have started; and unless they are 
directly working for the defeat or success of a can-
didate, they can take money without anybody ever re-
Vol. I , No. 9 October 1982 
TransAfrica Forum Issue Brief© 
545 Eighth Street S.E., Suite 200 
Washington, D.C. 20003 
Cherri D. Waters ................ Research Fellow 
Ibrahim Gossama .............. Research Assistant 
Menda Ahart . . .. . . . . .... . ....... Administrator 
Randall Robinson .. . ... .. ... . . . Executive Director 
ISSN 0730-SSX 
cording it. If an organization publishes a voting record, 
for example, it doesn't have to be recorded as a con-
tribution to a candidate or against a candidate. Ob-
viously, they do it very secretly because it would hurt 
them publicly if people knew that South Africa was con-
tributing to the organization. 
What connection do these groups have with the Reagan 
administration? 
CLARK: The South Africans are quite right in looking 
at the Reagan administration as a great benefit to them. 
Almost anybody on the far right that you talk to is sym-
pathetic to South Africa. I don't know why the two go 
together necessarily. I debate William Rusher, the 
publisher of the NATIONAL REVIEW, frequently; 
and the South African propaganda always comes out. 
THE SOUTH AFRICANS ARE QUITE RIGHT IN 
LOOKING AT THE REAGAN ADMINSITRATION 
AS A GREAT BENEFIT TO THEM. 
It's amazing. Why the far right identifies with South 
Africa I don't know. I suppose it's the anti-communism 
element because they talk about Argentina and other 
such countries in a favorable light as well. 
Did the South African government take any direct ac-
tion against you? 
CLARK: Early in the campaign, someone on the South 
African embassy staff campaigned against me. He went 
around to groups and gave speeches. However, Secre-
tary of State Cyrus Vance heard about it and told the 
South Africans that the man had to be recalled to South 
Africa . He was declared persona non grata and was sent 
home. That was the end of any direct attempt against 
me. 
What other kinds of experiences with South Africa did 
you have while you were in the Senate? 
CLARK: The first time I went to South Africa in 1976, 
I met with Prime Minister John Vorster. It was the most 
difficult meeting I ever went to in my life . For an hour 
he quoted to me things I had said or done. I remember 
on one occasion he said, "Tell me about this meeting in 
Lesotho that you're co-chairman of." He would quote 
to me things that I had said at some small college out in 
Nebraska. They had apparently covered every speech I 
ever did anyplace. 
It's eerie to think that this kind of government has 
that kind of access. It shows you can buy a lot with 
money. They've obviously got this country well covered 
in terms of what's happening where and who is doing 
what and why. I don't want to sound too conspiratorial, 
but their information sources are very good. They're 
putting a lot of money into this country. They buy in-
formation to keep informed. They have a kind of 
paranoia anyway. There never was anything I did or 
said about which they didn't know. The Prime Minister 
obviously had more information and knew more about 
what I had said than I remembered. □ 
THE MULDERGATE SCANDAL 
In February 1974 South African Prime Minister John 
Vorster met with Gen. Hendrik van den Burgh, head of 
the Bureau of State Security (BOSS); Information Min-
ister Dr. Cornelius Mulder (hence "Muldergate"), the 
man thought to be Vorster's successor; and Secretary of 
Information Esche! Rhoodie. What they gathered to 
discuss, according to Rhoodie, was " ... a propaganda 
war in which no rules or regulations would count." 
The strategy for this $70 million war was developed 
by Rhoodie; the battlefields were to be the major cities 
of the world-Washington, London, New York, Paris. 
For Rhoodie the aim was to "sell South Africa" by any 
means necessary. His projects in the U.S. were designed 
to buy friends in high places and to enhance South 
Africa's influence. By Rhoodie's own admission, in so 
doing he violated both American and South African 
law. 
The most well-known of Rhoodie's projects involved 
the targeting of two liberal Senators for electoral defeat. 
Rhoodie alleges that the Department of Information 
contributed about $150,000 to the 1976 campaign to 
unseat Senator John Tunney of California. In 1978 well 
over $250,000 was contributed to Robert Jepsen's suc-
cessful campaign against Senator Dick Clark. Despite 
the clear violation of U.S. law, both the Justice Depart-
ment and the Ethics Committee of the U.S. House of 
Representatives have dropped their investigations of 
these allegations. 
In 1977 the Department of Information paid about 
$110,000 to several American trade unions to prevent 
their support of a blockade against South African ship-
ping organized by the International Federation of Fret 
Trade Unions. 
Moreover, South Africa funded John P. McGoff's 
unsuccessful bid to purchase the Washington Star and 
his successful bid to purchase the Sacramento Union. 
Allegedly, gold bullion from Rhoodie's secret fund was 
smuggled out of South Africa and fuqneled to McGoff. 
It also has been reported that McGoff's firm, Global 
Communications, used South African funds to pur-
chase a fifty percent share of United Press International 
Television News (UPITN). Although McGoff has 
denied these charges, he has publicly declared his sup-
port of the South African regime, promising to do any-
thing in his power to bring that country closer to the 
U.S. 
By January 1978, the South African press and public 
had been made aware of Rhoodie's "war." Rhoodie 
fled the country and made his now famous confession in 
France. Prime Minister Vorster and Cabinet Minister 
Mulder were forced to resign. Later, Rhoodie was extra-
dited to South Africa, tried for fraud and theft of gov-
ernment funds, and sentenced to six years in jail. 
Ostensibly, the revelation of the Muldergate scandal 
ended South Africa's illegal "war" for Americans' 
"hearts and minds." It must be noted, however, that 
South African officials did not disclose the details of all 
Rhoodie's projects , and a number of them were to be 
continued. D 
THE DENTON HEARINGS 
In March Senator Jeremiah Denton (R-Ala), a cham-
pion of "New Right" causes, held five days of hearings 
on what he titled, "The Role of the Soviet Union, Cuba, 
and East Germany in Fomenting Terrorism in Southern 
Africa." The hearings, conducted by the Senate Sub-
committee of Security and Terrorism which Denton 
chairs, sought to establish as a matter of public record 
that the leading liberation movements in southern 
Africa-the ANC and SW APO-were in fact terrorist 
groups controlled and directed by Moscow. 
During the course of the hearings, it became apparent 
that the South African government-not Denton and 
his staff-was the primary force behind the Senate pro-
ceedings. South Africa provided the majority of the wit-
nesses for the hearings-police informers and captured 
soldiers-as well as documents and photographs to be 
entered into the record and an arms display of Soviet-
made weapons. In his opening remarks, Denton said 
that "The subcommittee's investigators would not have 
been able to produce the body of evidence to be present-
ed in these hearings without the cooperation of the 
South African government." Consequently, South 
Africa was provided an opportunity to present its famil-
iar case that liberation struggles in southern Africa 
result not from racial repression and colonial occupa-
tion but from communist expansion in the region. The 
Denton hearings simply mark South Africa's latest suc-
cessful attempt to use another American forum to 
legitimize their claims. 
Some of the witnesses apparently had trouble reading 
their own statements despite denials that others had 
prepared their testimony. Witnesses from southern 
Africa included: three former ANC members turned 
police informers; one former ANC member who is the 
niece of Lennox Sebe, the president of the Ciskei ban-
tustan; two SWAPO soldiers captured in Namibia; an 
official from the South African-backed DT A govern-
ment in Namibia; a Mozambican pilot who had deserted 
to South Africa and has been cooperating with military 
intelligence there; and a former SW APO leader who 
now heads the breakaway SW APO-Democrats in 
Namibia. 
Their testimony included descriptions of the structure 
of the ANC and SW APO and of the type of aid these 
organizations receive from Eastern bloc countries. Den-
ton argued that the testimony supported South Africa's 
claim that the Soviets had a "grand design" for all of 
southern Africa and that they control and direct the 
leadership of the ANC and SW APO-both now terror-
ist surrogates for communist expansion. 
Senator Denton had hoped to attract major media at-
tention to the Soviet role in southern Africa as he de-
fined it; only the South African press, however, turned 
out in large numbers. The American press understand-
ably had grown a bit skeptical of these "Guerrilla of the 
Week" type proceedings after the infamous Nicaraguan 
star witness debacle. He was able, nonetheless , to give 
the South Africans another occasion to mislead the 
American public. D 
SOUTH AFRICA'S HIRED GUNS: THE REGISTERED FOREIGN AGENTS 
The apartheid government of South Africa has devel-
oped a network of highly paid lobbyists with solid con-
nections to the New Right in an increasingly aggressive 
bid to influence U.S. domestic and foreign policies. The 
expressed policy of the Reagan administration to 
develop closer ties with South Africa and the appoint-
ment of South Africa sympathizers and ex-lobbyists to 
key government positions have acted as a spur to these 
activities. 
Among the lobbyists engaged by South Africa in this 
new phase of its constant battle to improve its image in 
the U.S. is John P. Sears of the Washington law firm, 
Baskin and Sears. Mr. Sears, a former campaign direc-
tor for President Reagan, and his firm received more 
than $750,000 in 1981, "to lobby, represent, advise, and 
assist in the promotion of the political, economic, and 
cultural objectives of [South Africa] . " 
The agreement between the law firm and South 
Africa was reached in January of 1981 as the new 
Reagan administration was taking shape. A junior part-
ner in the firm, Philip J . Hare, appears to be directly in 
charge of their efforts on behalf of South Africa. Mr. 
Hare, who became an American citizen in 1980, was 
born in Parys, South Africa. 
Baskin and Sears has lobbied intensively to weaken 
U.S. restrictions on trade with South Africa. They have 
aided the granting of export licenses to corporations do-
ing business with South Africa and given advice on a 
possible "Investment Treaty" between the two coun-
tries. During the Senate hearings on ·"Terrorism in 
Southern Africa" conducted by Senator Jeremiah Den-
ton(R-Ala) last March, the firm not only actively con-
sulted with the counsel of the subcommittee, Joel 
Lisker, but it also assisted "in interviewing potential 
witnesses." 
Another Washington law firm working for the South 
African regime is Smathers, Symington, and Herlong. It 
was retained by South Africa in early 1980 for an all-
inclusive annual fee of $300,000. The firm, however, is 
generously reimbursed for "expenses not within the 
scope of the contract." Smathers, Symington, and 
Herlong gives South Africa the services of the Former 
Senator George Smathers of Florida and the former 
Congressman James Symington of Missouri , both long-
time democrats . Both men were closely associated with 
the Kennedy administration. A review of the firm 's reg-
is tration , filed pursuant to section two of the Foreign 
Agents Registration Act, shows extensive financial con-
tributions of the firm and its senior members to politi-
cians including: the Carter-Mondale Campaign and 
Senators Kennedy, Jackson, Byrd, Long, and Cannon. 
Smathers and Symington worked for the defeat of 
bills limiting or prohibiting new U.S. investment in 
South Africa. They lobbied in favor of the American 
tour of the South African National Rugby team and op-
posed House Resolution 214 of September 1981 , which 
condemned South Africa 's invasion of Angola. 
At the time of their appointment as South Africa 's 
legal advisors, much was made of the Smathers and 
Symington connection to the liberal wing of the Demo-
cratic Party. It was even suggested, according to the 
Rand Daily Mail of July 16, 1982, that their appoint-
ment marked "an official break with the Rhoodie 
method of influencing U.S. opinion." However, the 
election of Ronald Reagan and the increased influence 
of the New Right activists encouraged South Africa to 
seek more conservative representation. In John Sears, 
South Africa has found a near perfect choice. 
More aggressive than Baskin and Sears or Smathers 
and Symington in the promotion of South Africa's in-
terests is the U.S.-South West Africa/Namibia Trade 
and Cultural Council. Its directors are Carl L. Shipley, 
Marion H. Smoak, and Thomas C. Henry of the 
Washington law firm of Shipley, Smoak, and Henry. 
This council is the registered agent for the South 
African created Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DT A) 
~overnment of Namibia. 
With hundreds of thousands of dollars at its disposal, 
this lobby has developed a hit list of national legislators 
that it wants defeated this November. Prominent among 
them is Michigan Congressman Howard Wolpe, Chair-
man of the House Africa Subcommittee, in whose cam-
paign they have promised to become "pretty heavily" 
involved. Shipley and Smoak have published several 
editorials in their Namibia News Gazette virulently 
critical of Congressman Wolpe. They have, in conjunc-
tion with other New Right activists, issued press releases 
attacking the Congressman. 
The attacks on Wolpe have received the support of 
Michigan publisher, John P. McGoff, who has been 
under investigation by the Justice Department and the 
Securities and Exchange Commission. McGoff allegedly 
acted as an unregistered agent for South Africa and 
used South African funds in an unsuccessful attempt to 
purchase the Washington Star and a successful one to 
acquire the Sacramento Union. 
The Shipley and Smoak lobby also has been engaged 
in a campaign of harassment against Gulf Oil Corpora-
tion and SWAPO representatives in the United States. 
A suit brought by the lobby against SW APO in the U.S . 
District Court for the District of Columbia charges 
SW APO with willfully violating the Foreign Agents 
Act. Among other things, the lobby is asking the court 
to enjoin SWAPO from representing itself in the TJ .S. 
The unprecedented suit is unlikely to go far. It is ques-
tionable whether the lobby has standing to sue in this 
case. The aim seems to be to distract SW APO and its 
supporters more than anything else. 
The available records show that South Africa's regis-
tered agents together spend millions of dollars promot-
ing South Africa's interests in the U.S. What the records 
do not show is how unregistered agents, business in-
terests, and right wing ideologues combine to expend 
millions more, illegally serving the aims 'of the racist 
minority government and subverting the American 
democratic process. □ 
REAGAN WATCH: AN ALLIANCE AMONG FRIENDS 
"Can we abandon a country that has stood 
beside us in every war we ever fought? A coun-
try that strategically, is essential to the Free 
World in its production of minerals that we all 
must have? 
President Ronald Reagan 
March 3, 1981 
Since the disclosure of State Department documents 
in August 1981, the Reagan administration has been 
moving American policy toward South Africa closer 
and closer to "the side of the whites." Indeed, the 
Reagan administration considers South Africa a friend 
worthy of U.S. sympathy and support. The link be-
tween the Reagan administration and South Africa is 
the host of administration advisors, officials, and sup-
porters who are openly sympathetic to and long asso-
ciated with Pretoria. 
Reagan's advisors on foreign affairs have been de-
scribed by the Washington Post as "almost a Who's 
Who of leading rightist theoreticians and activists ." 
Core conservative think tanks such as the American 
Enterprise Institute, the Center for Strategic and Inter-
national Studies, the Hoover Institution, the Heritage 
Foundation, and the Committee for the Present Danger 
serve as the breeding ground and cooling-off point for 
the New Right. All take a pro-South Africa line, and 
most have been pleased with Reagan's handling of the 
situation. They argue that although change will come to 
South Africa, it must come about led by whites through 
measures such as the Botha "reforms." Peter Duignan, 
a campaign advisor to Reagan, and Lewis Gann at the 
Hoover Institution wrote, for example, that U.S. policy 
should "promote trade, economic co-operation, and 
cultural exchanges ... " with South Africa. 
Among administration officials involved in foreign 
policymaking, relatively few identify with black aspira-
tions in southern Africa. A number, however, clearly 
have been linked with South Africa's white minority 
regime in some way. Richard Allen, formerly National 
Security Advisor and currently with the Heritage Foun-
dation, was a lobbyist on behalf of the white Portuguese 
colonies in Africa during 1972. Allen is quoted as saying 
that the U.S. should take the "politically courageous 
act" of publicly recognizing South Africa as an "ally." 
Thomas Moorer of the President's Foreign Intelligence 
Advisory Board has taken several trips to South Africa 
paid by the South African government. Richard Mellon 
Scaife, whose newspapers often run features favorable· 
to the South African government, recently acquired the 
Sacramento Union from John P. McGoff. Scaife also 
reportedly paid for the travel expenses of Professor 
Peter Vanneman, who testified at Senator Denton's 
hearings on southern Africa. Vanneman traveled from 
South Africa where he was on sabbatical. Scaife, one of 
the largest individual contributors to the New Right, sits 
on the Board of Directors of the proposed U.S . pro-
paganda station directed toward Cuba, Radio Marti. 
William Simon, Chair of the President 's Advisory Com-
mittee on Productivity, also has made several trips to 
South Africa paid for by the South African govern-
ment. Marvin Leibman, now Director of Public Affairs 
for the National Endowment for the Humanities, 
launched the pro-South Africa American African Af-
fairs Association (AAAA) in 1965. Early AAAA board 
members included william Rusher, publisher of the 
National Review, which regularly features articles sym-
pathetic to South Africa. Jay Parker, a black conser-
vative who now heads AAAA, purports to represent the 
Republic of Venda, a South Africa created-but inter-
nationally unrecognized-bantustan, for $36,000 a 
year. AAAA was the publisher -of the Duignan and 
Gann pamphlet quoted above. Joseph Churba, an 
analyst with the Department of Defense and former 
Regan campaign advisor, made widely publicized 
remarks in support of South Africa-later repudiated 
by Assistant Secretary of State Chester Crocker. Chur-
ba is quoted as saying that South Africa's strategic im-
portance should be the "overwhelming factor" in rela-
tions between the U.S. and South Africa. Robert 
Cabelli, the recently hired special assistant to Chester 
Crocker, is a former employee of the South African 
mining firm, Goldfields. Cabelli has close relations with 
prominent South Africans such as the deputy director of 
the South African U .N . mission. 
Perhaps, the most highly 
placed link between the ad-
ministration and South Africa 
is Donald deKieffer, General 
Counsel in the White House 
Special Trade Representative's 
Office. DeKieffer, a registered 
agent for South Africa until 
Donald deKieffer 1979, was hired by Esche! 
Rhoodie in 1974 while he was with the firm, Collier, 
Shannon, Rill, and Edwards in New York. DeKieffer' s 
services to South Africa included lavish entertaining 
averaging more than $30,000 a year. In addition, 
deKieffer made personal political contributions to can-
didates sympathetic to his client's interests. 
DeKieffer's appointment to the Trade Office parallels 
the loosening of restrictions on trade with South Africa. 
Despite the apparent conflict of interests, he admits to 
attending a meeting of high-ranking officials from the 
Commerce and State Departments during which South 
Africa related issues were discussed. Shortly after the 
Reagan administration 's relaxation of restrictions on 
trade with South Africa was announced, deKieffer 
made a trip to the country to address American busi-
nessmen there and to meet with South African trade of-
ficials. DeKieffer has argued that he has been careful to 
"recuse" or to disquality himself from any discussion 
with direct bearing on South Africa. 
Clearly , the South Africa sympathizers now serving in 
or closely connected with the Reagan administration 
outnumber the black Americans who have influence 
with the same administration. The impact of this im-
balance in influence will be devastating for twenty mil-
lion black South Africans. D 
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